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David Colander argued to this Society two years ago that the term `` neoclassical
economics’ ’ ought to be declared dead (Colander 2000). I concur with him on
the verdict, but do so for diVerent reasons.1 Colander’s argument was that
neoclassicism possessed six primary attributes, and much of mainstream eco-
nomics cannot be characterized in these terms. My argument is simpler. It is
that neoclassical economics was primarily a theory of the human individual in
economic life (albeit a ¯ awed one), but contemporary mainstream economics
does not possess a theory of the human individual. This conclusion may not
surprise those who have re¯ ected on the rise of formalism in economics in the
postwar period. But for two reasons I think it important to emphasize the
disappearance of a theory of the individual from economics. First, because
neoclassicism implemented and defended for nearly a century one particular
philosophical conception of the individual central to western thought since the
Enlightenment, the abandonment of this commitment by mainstream economics
is an important part of our understanding of its evolution and its relation to
social thinking generally. Second, the demise of the individual in mainstream
economics is also signi® cant because, having abandoned the individual, main-
stream economics is no longer capable of oVering a defense of the individual in
contemporary society. Indeed its project, I will suggest, is in important respects
anti-individualist . It may be naõ È ve on my part to think contemporary society
still engaged in a defense of the individual. Nonetheless, I hold that thinking
about the individual remains fundamental to how many people think about the
social world, and that consequently mainstream economics’ abandonment of the
individual may render it historically irrelevant , perhaps contributing to its
fragmentation and dissolution as an identi® able approach in economics. Thus
the important conclusion to draw may not be Colander’s: that we have seen the
death of neoclassical economics. It may be that at issue today is the death of
mainstream economics.
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I. MODERNISM AS DUALISM: ORIGINS OF THE MODERNIST
THEORY OF THE INDIVIDUAL
I begin with discussion of the origins of the Enlightenment theory of the
individual that came to underlie neoclassical economics at the end of the
nineteenth century. That theory arises in a Cartesian-Newtonian dualism of
subjectivity and nature underlying modernist conceptions of science and society.2
Contemporary history of science emphasizes the Newtonian vision and the
nature side of this dualism, but the inseparable accompaniment of this vision of
Newton was Descartes’s conception of human subjectivity in a new theory of
the individual as disengaged, subjective inwardness. In my view, like most
dualisms, this Cartesian-Newtonian one was fundamentally problematic and
therefore ultimately unsustainable in each of its aspects. Just as we cannot
understand nature purely as mechanism, so we cannot understand the human
individual purely as disengaged subjectivity. Thus, looking ahead, that neo-
classicism took up this particular conception of the individual planted the seeds
of its ultimate dissolution as a theory of the individual in economics.
In Sources of the Self : The Making of the Modern Identity, Charles Taylor
locates the origins of the modern concept of the individual as a disengaged
subject and subjective inwardness in the rejection of the pre-scienti® c, medieval
worldview of nature (Taylor 1989). In the seventeenth century, nature came to
be understood as a mechanism. But in the pre-scienti® c, medieval world,
everything was governed by eternal Ideas imperfectly embodied in the physical
world. Plato was an important early developer of this conception, but it
was systematically integrated into Christian theology with the eternal Ideas
understood as the Thoughts of God. On this view, the things of ordinary life are
exempli® cations of a cosmic order teleologically organized to exhibit Reason
and Goodness in Plato and then the Wisdom of God in Christian theology. In
contrast to the later, modernist conception of the human mind as a mirror of
nature (Rorty 1979), before the Enlightenment nature was the image of mind, that
is, the mind of God.3 Adopting a view of the world as mechanism dethroned
this picture of the world. Descartes still preserved a place for God outside of
nature by supposing the world operated according to the axioms of mathematics
and analytic geometry, themselves determined by divine ® at. More importantly,
he supposed that our capacity to understand the world as mechanism depended
upon our being able to form clear and distinct ideas that only God guaranteed.
This assumption brought with it a new understanding of the individual, intro-
duced by Descartes in his famous cogito argument in which he withdrew into
himself in doubting his beliefs until ® nding certainty in clear and distinct ideas.
But God only guaranteed us a capacity for clear and distinct ideas, and we might
still have obscure and indistinct ones. How, then, were scientists to proceed in
2 It should be noted that Newton’s own thinking on this score was more complex than what was to
emerge as the `` triumphant Newtonian model’ ’ (Taylor 1989, p. 171).
3 C. L. Becker puts this particularly well in connection with the vision of Newton: `` Obviously the
disciples of the Newtonian philosophy had not ceased to worship. They had given another form
and a new name to the object of worship: having denatured God, they dei® ed nature’ ’ (Becker,
1948, p. 63).
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producing scienti® c truths about the world? Descartes’s solution was to distin-
guish between primary and secondary qualities of things. The source of our
obscure and indistinct ideas are the distortions of sensation and perception,
which concern secondary qualities, such as color, taste, smell, sound, and
temperature, as compared to primary qualities such as ® gure, number, position,
and size. Descartes’ view was that only primary properties were `` in’ ’ nature, and
that secondary qualities were `` in’ ’ our minds. Attaining scienti® c truth thus
required that we disengage ourselves from our normal way of seeing the world,
and rely upon our God-given ability to form clear and distinct ideas of the way
the world was in itself, or in terms of its primary qualities. Descartes’s famous
cogito argument, then, was not just the basis for a new epistemology and
ontology of nature. It was also the basis for a new view of the individual Ð one
that withdrew from the world to understand the world.
This dualism of a world made up of an inner subjective domain and an outer
objective domain was Descartes’s great contribution to modern thinking, and it
remains the foundation for modernist thinking about the individual as disengaged
subjectivity and external nature as mechanism. But Descartes’s recourse to an
inner reason guaranteed by God was unacceptable in Locke’s seventeenth-
century Protestant England that combined regicide, a hatred of Catholicism, and
the in¯ uence of Newton and Boyle. Locke began by rejecting Descartes’ doctrine
of innate ideas, which he feared would be used to justify opinion and false views.
He called for clearing away `` the rubbish that lies in the way to knowledge’ ’
(Locke 1689, p. 14), and proposed to rebuild knowledge out of the simple ideas
of sense experience as incorruptible, inalterable atoms of understanding. This
rebuilding took the form of an assembly and re-assembly of simple ideas to
create complex ideas out of simple ones, so that a quasi-mechanical, associational
organization of the mind matched the mechanical organization of nature. In
keeping with Descartes, this assembly and re-assembly of simple ideas involved
a `` double movement of suspension and examination [in which] we wrest the
control of our thinking and outlook away from passion or custom or authority
and assume responsibility for it ourselves’ ’ (Taylor 1989, p. 167).
Thus, Locke was more radical than Descartes in his understanding of subjective
inwardness. Whereas Descartes relied on God to guarantee clear and distinct
ideas, Locke gave this directly to the individual in the ability to recognize the
simple and inalterable ideas of sense experience. For Locke, this more disengaged
self was consequently de® ned simply as private consciousness. `` For it is by the
consciousness it has of its present thoughts and actions, that it is a self to itself
now, and so will be the same self, as far as the same consciousness can extend
to actions past and to come’’ (Locke 1975, 2.27.10) . In this way, he gave the
strongest possible interpretation to the Cartesian-Newtonian dualism of subject
and object worlds. Not only is consciousness intrinsically private, but as inten-
tional, it is always of something. Individuals are always separate from what they
are conscious of, and accordingly always outside of and removed from the world.
The self as consciousness, then, is pure subjectivity. Taylor emphasizes this in
characterizing Locke’s idea of the individual as a `` punctual’ ’ self, where this
image of a geometrical point conveys that the self must always be `` extensionless’ ’
in regard to the world of nature (Taylor 1989, pp. 171± 72).
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I said above that dualisms are generally problematic and the propositions that
make them up typically unsustainable. One manifestation of the unsustainability
of the Enlightenment’s subjectivity-nature dualism is that the concept of the self
as pure disengaged private consciousness does not withstand much scrutiny.
Thus, there exists a long history of critique of Locke’s conception of the
individual, culminating most recently in the postmodernist deconstruction of the
subject. In the ® rst place, the idea of complete disengagement from the world is
contrived and shallow, made all the more unsupportable by Locke’s associationist
psychology/epistemology. The problem is that if the self is de® ned in terms of
disengagement, but cannot realistically disengage, then the self is either unde® ned,
or is de® ned away through the individual’s identi® cation with others (termed
`` social identi® cation’ ’ in contemporary social psychology literature). In the
second place, if the disengaged self is de® ned as private consciousness, then, as
the Wittgensteinian private language argument has it, there is really nothing that
can be said about it. The self thus understood becomes meaningless. My goal
here, however, is not to discuss the ways in which the idea of the individual as
subjectively inward is unsustainable, but rather to portray the neoclassical
understanding of the individual as simultaneously an attachment to this concep-
tion and a history of continued eVorts to escape its contradictions. Yet, having
begun with that Lockean conception, ® nal escape from it also brought to an end
neoclassicism as a theory of the individual in economics.
II. THE RISE AND FALL OF NEOCLASSICAL ECONOMICS
Neoclassical economics, beginning with cardinal utility theory and continuing
through ordinalist utility theory, de® nes individuals in terms of their private
psychologies, ® rst in terms of wants and desires and then in terms of preferences.
The idea of the individual as disengaged subjectivity is the basis for its view of
the individual as atomistic in that individuals are autonomous by virtue of their
each having access to only their own private states of consciousness. Indeed,
atomistic individualism is simply the Enlightenment view of the individual,
brought to perfection by Locke, applied to economic life. But this understanding
also underlies much of the rest of neoclassical economics. Consumer sover-
eigntyÐ a key foundation for welfare economicsÐ is based on the idea that
individual preferences are inviolate, since individuals alone know their own
preferences. Indeed, once one introduces social evaluation of preferences, and
asks about `` good’ ’ and `` bad’ ’ tastes, one can no longer exclude discussion of
such non-welfare concerns as equity, fairness, and justice (cf. Cowen 1993). But
to best understand how neoclassicism took up the Lockean theory of the
individual, and at the same time see the dilemmas of dualism, it helps to ask
how individuals disengaged from the world are able to operate on the world.
Smith, who was the ® rst to oVer a solution to this problem, sought to
reconcile subjectivity and nature by using the Scottish Enlightenment concept of
unintended consequences to say the market worked as if by an invisible hand
(Smith 1776). Individuals brought their private subjectivities to bear upon one
another in competition and exchange, but only at a distance or removed from
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their manifestation in buying and selling activities. This made the market a
fundamentally natural, Newtonian process, which still presupposed Ð behind the
scenes, as it wereÐ the private interests of individuals. The metaphor of the
invisible hand captured this dualism of subjective and objective, because it
allowed the market to be explained as an observably mechanical process
depending upon subjective interest as the invisible force driving it. But in
providing a metaphorical solution to the problem of dualism, Smith did not
resolve it. With subjectivity a hidden, invisible force, it was also possible to
describe economic life in Newtonian cause-and-eVect terms, making no essential
reference to individuals. Much of the history of macroeconomics adopts this
conclusion, and indeed the divide between microeconomics and macroeconomics,
including the debates over micro-foundations, can be interpreted as a consequence
of unresolved dilemmas created by Enlightenment dualism.
I take marginalist economics, both cardinal and ordinal, as neoclassical in
improving on Smith’s answer to the problem of dualism via the theory of
instrumentally rational choice. Instrumental reason ties individual subjectivity
to the world through choices that most eYciently implement individuals ’ wants
and desires or preferences. The key to the idea of eYcient implementation is
being able to diVerentiate eYcient from ineYcient means, which in turn requires
knowing just how means address one’s ends. Neoclassical economics provided
this fuller account of individual ends by explaining the inner structure of
individual subjectivity, ® rst in terms of the principle of marginal utility, then in
terms of the successive developments of the analysis of preferences. This enabled
the marginalists to develop a more sophisticated theory of price than Smith had
produced, and also demonstrate that the market, understood quantitatively
and mechanically, depended in its operation upon the inner world of human
subjectivity. Newton’s world was thus made to depend on Locke’s world by an
enlargement of the latter, explained via the theory of instrumental reason.
Yet, this resolution of Smith’s problem also bore an unstated critique of
Locke’s view of the individual. As Wade Hands notes, in the theory of choice
`` rationality is solely a property of the relation between means and endsÐ being
rational simply involves choosing the most eYcient means for achieving any
given endÐ and has nothing to do with the nature of the end itself ’ ’ (Hands
2001, p. 236; emphasis added). Indeed, utility analysis Ð cardinal or ordinal Ð is
only one form of rational choice analysis. Thus, rational choice analysis works
given any speci® cation of ends suYciently detailed and structured to diVerentiate
eYcient from ineYcient means, and one need not make any reference to human
psychology to explain instrumentally rational behavior. While explaining ends
in terms of human psychology was the ® rst signi® cant use of instrumental
rationality in economics, the subsequent history of neoclassicism is a story of
the emptying out of human psychology from the theory of rational choice. Thus,
the advantages over Smith that the theory of choice permitted neoclassicism also
created the opportunity for retreat from Locke.
First to go was the cardinal utility speci® cation of individual psychology that
Jevons and Marshall relied on. This was driven in part by the view that Bentham’s
hedonistic psychology was a scienti® c embarrassment, as Robbins made evident
in his famous book (Robbins 1932). It was driven partly by an increasingly
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conservative profession’s reluctance to countenance egalitarian policies implied
by interpersonal utility comparisons. But that the cardinalist account of the
individual subjectivity was so easily abandoned was due to the fact that the
underlying logic of de® ning the individual as privately subjective precluded any
particular characterization of that private inwardness. Pareto intuitively grasped
this when he characterized human psychology in the weakest possible terms.
Individuals `` prefer’ ’ one combination of goods to another, but the language of
preferences says almost nothing about the human mind. Indeed, as has since
become clear, the term `` prefer’ ’ applied to combinations of goods only means
that these combinations are rank ordered, and rank ordering is a relation with
nothing in particular to do with human psychology. It can be applied to
individuals, but it can also be applied to agents of any kind said to distinguish
options, whether these agents are individuals or groups and whether they are
living or non-living. After Pareto, individual preferences were only nominally
subjective, and Locke’s imprint on neoclassical economics begins to fade.
An interesting part of the story concerns the Chicago school and Friedman’s
`` as if ’ ’ instrumentalism. As Phil Mirowski and Hands relate (Mirowski and
Hands 1998), Knight had contested the Hicks-Slutsky classical mechanics-
inspired approach to demand theory, holding out for a psychology account of
demand rooted in human motives. But Friedman in his famous article on the
Marshallian demand curve (Friedman 1949), though he claimed Knight’s mantle,
reasoned in `` as if ’ ’ manner that it was unnecessary to think in terms of utility
theory or indiVerence curves to explain demand. The same `` as if ’ ’ thinking then
reappeared in Stigler’s Theory of Price in which he further minimized the
importance of utility functions (Stigler 1952), and ® nally Stigler and Becker
(1977) made preferences insigni® cant to the determination of price by assuming
them neither to vary nor diVer importantly between people.
Samuelson, with his positivist-operationalis t methodology, helped complete
the emptying out of human psychology from choice analysis with his revealed
preference approach. In his 1938 paper his goal was `` to develop the theory of
consumer behavior freed from any vestigial traces of the utility concept,’ ’ and he
carefully avoided using the language of preferences or anything that referred to
the subjectivity of individuals (Samuelson 1938). In his paper a decade later in
which he introduced and defended the revealed preference concept as intersubjec-
tively observable, preferences do not dictate an individual’ s choices, but rather
an individual’ s preferences are said to be revealed according to the observable
choices the individual makes (Samuelson 1948). Samuelson did shift his emphasis
to argue that revealed preference theory was observationally equivalent to ordinal
utility theory rather than a substitute for it, but from the point of view of the
profession, the damage was done. One might make reference to human psycho-
logy in explaining economic behavior, but doing so was unnecessary. Samuelson
thus ® nally resolved the problem of Enlightenment dualism by dropping Locke’s
subjective inwardness side, and recasting the world in pure Newtonian terms.
I thus close the history of neoclassicism with its ® nal abandonment of the
Lockean theory of the human individual as subjective inwardness. Mainstream
economics, I suggest, begins roughly with this changeover, and may be diVerenti-
ated from neoclassicism by its agnosticism regarding the nature of individual
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economic agents. Indeed, those few economists such as Simon who have separated
themselves from the mainstream in attempting to develop new psychologica l
foundations for the individual in economics have often seen their ideas trans-
formed and appropriated for generally mainstream formalist purposes (cf. Sent
1997). Formal representation of the individual now dominates. But being able to
represent individuals formally falls well short of having a theory of the individual.
Mainstream economics may refer to individuals in an ad hoc manner, but it has
no new theory of the individual to replace the one given up. Indeed, as the
product of both a Cartesian-Newtonian dualism and a failed attempt to sustain
a subjectivist theory of the individual, it may be that mainstream economics
cannot have a theory of the individual, and is ultimately left with modeling
individuals as mechanisms.
III. THE EMPEROR’S CLOTHES
The motivation for my title is my view that many economists still believe
mainstream economics is about individuals or is somehow individualist . I am
not going to attempt to say what de® nes mainstream economics. Rather, here I
only identify three unresolved problems in the neoclassical subjectivist theory of
the individual that were inherited by mainstream economics, and which provide
good reasons for thinking that mainstream economics is no longer really about
individuals.
One problem is that there is nothing in neoclassical economics’ treatment of
individuals to preclude their dissolution into multiple selves. The multiple selves
problem attracted interest for a time from individuals such as Sen, Harsanyi,
Schelling, and Elster, but perhaps because it appeared insoluble within the
neoclassical framework, the topic ceased to be discussed. Gregory Kavka (1991)
drew the clearest conclusions about the matter when he argued that multiple
selves individual choice problems are logically equivalent to multiple individual
social choice problems. That is, intrapersonal collective choice problems are
essentially the same as interpersonal collective choice problems, so that in the
way of any account of the individual as a unitary being are the individual
equivalent of prisoner’s dilemmas, majority voting paradoxes, Arrow impos-
sibility results, etc. Thus for Kavka, the idea of there being a single utility
ranking for the individual is a special case, whereas a multiple selves theory
provides a general theory of `` individuals’ ’ with diVerent, incommensurable sub-
orderings. From this perspective, lingering attachments to the idea of a unitary
individual in economics, as often defended under the label methodological
individualism, really constitute a kind of closet methodological collectivism,
though in this instance one applied to the collection of selves within the
`` individual,’ ’ rather than to collections of individuals within the group.
A second problem concerns talking about individuals through time. Though
neoclassicism was originally a point-in-time, static equilibrium analysis, with the
introduction of the time allocation model, in which individuals purchase market
commodities to home produce ® nal goods, individuals acquired a through-time
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dimension (Becker 1965). One of the most important applications of the time
allocation model involves investments in human capital, where the types of
human capital investments most relevant to the theory of the individual de® ned
as subjective inwardness are those in which the ® nal goods produced are skills
and talents embodied in individuals themselves. Though Stigler and Becker’s de
gustibus non est disputandum paper argued that individual preferences do not
change (Stigler and Becker 1977), it is diYcult to believe that a process of
self-investment in human capital does not change people’s preferences. Yet if
preferences are constantly changing, then on neoclassicism’ s Lockean view of
the individual, the individual is constantly changing. Among other things, this
upsets welfare economics which sum-ranks individual utilities based on given
preferences in making Pareto judgments. Policy recommendations in a world of
embodiable human capital investments then require a variety of non-individualis t
considerations, such as what type of society ought we to promote, who is
entitled to opportunities for human development, how are we to understand
intergenerational equity, etc.
A third problem concerns formalist representation of individuals in mainstream
economics. Mirowski has argued contemporary formalist economics blurs the
line between life and machine, and that economics has become a cyborg science
(Mirowski 2001; also cf. Haraway 1991). I understand this in terms of the
question of whether mental processes are treated as perspectival and intentional
or as purely logical computational processes. The latter involve sequences of
formal or syntactical symbolsÐ independent of interpretation, meaning, and
semantical contentÐ that may in principle be instantiated in any sort of hardware,
whether humans, animals, mechanisms such as thermostats, or computers and
arti® cial intelligences of all kinds. Formalist mainstream economics, by aban-
doning subjective inwardness as characteristic of the individual, no longer
characterizes individuals as intentional beings, and consequently has no reason
not to consider human individuals just one more type of hardware. In eVect,
treating `` mental’ ’ processes as computational processes means that mainstream
economics does not diVerentiate among kinds of hardware. Indeed, strictly
speaking, mainstream economics does not even talk about individuals in any
real world, natural kinds sense, since it individuates decision-centers in an ad hoc
way according to the problem at hand. Anything can be an individual if it can
be ascribed a set of computational processes.
I take these three problemsÐ the multiple selves fragmentation of the indi-
vidual, the ambiguity of the individual through time, and the modeling of
mind as a computational processesÐ to be consequences of the fundamentally
problematic nature of neoclassicism’s subjectivist theory of the individual. And,
since mainstream economics lacks a new theory of the individual, these problems
also characterize its state of disarray whenever it attempts to speak about
individuals. Today, mainstream economics still proudly wears an individualis t
garbÐ its emperor’s clothesÐ but only, as with the storybook emperor, out of a
false sense of past magni® cence. We all know how the story ends. The emperor
only discovers his nakednessÐ the pronoun `` his’ ’ is intentionalÐ after it has
already become evident to all his subjects. The only question in my mind about
the story’s end is whether our emperor will be embarrassed when this occurs.
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IV. THE DEATH OF MAINSTREAM ECONOMICS?
Colander’s argument is that neoclassical economics is dead, but mainstream
economics is alive and well. I believe mainstream economics may not be in very
good health at all, ® rst, because mainstream economics does not constitute the
sort of uni® ed research program that attracts resources and commands in¯ uence,
and second, because mainstream economics’ ideological role in contemporary
society has become ambiguous.
Neoclassical economics did constitute a well-identi® ed research program.
Colander nicely summarizes the characteristics of that program, but others have
done so as well. Two emphases are generally common to these accounts:
neoclassical economics can be identi® ed both in terms of its substantive content
and in terms of its methods. In contrast with neoclassical economics, however,
mainstream economics is a far less cohesive and uni® ed orientation in economics.
Many strands of research within itÐ rational choice theory, game theory, experi-
mental economics, bounded rationality, complexity theory, computational eco-
nomics, evolutionary economicsÐ bear limited relation to one another as regards
their content and objects of research. The nature of economic behavior, the kinds
of economic agents, the structures within which economic agents operate,
the sorts of outcomes investigated, the normative themes considered, all vary
signi® cantly across these diVerent approaches in a way that was not the case in
neoclassical economics. Perhaps not surprisingly, then, few today seem to want
to de® ne mainstream economics in terms of its content.
Rather, most seeking to characterize mainstream economics as a single orienta-
tion in economics have emphasized the second way of de® ning research programs,
namely, that they share a single set of methods. For example, Colander considers
characterizing mainstream economics as `` ad hoc modeling’ ’ (Colander 2000,
p. 141), Tony Lawson sees mainstream economics as `` deductivist’ ’ and based on
event regularities (Lawson 1997, p. 16), Bob Coats suggests that mainstream (or
orthodox) economics be de® ned by its commitment to rigorous analysis (Coats
2000), and many have simply called mainstream economics formalist. I am
sympathetic to emphasizing method as a way of understanding mainstream
economics but am not convinced that mainstream economics can be regarded as
a uni® ed research program on this basis. In the ® rst place, methodological
characterizations such as these tend to be fairly general, making it a real issue
whether the multitude of tools and techniques that diVerent approaches employ
fall under the proposed description. Second, from a sociological point of view it
is a risky strategy to emphasize shared methods as the de® ning feature of
mainstream economics when the status and prestige of its practitioners seems to
be determined in an arms race of ever newly introduced tools and techniques.
I think it is better to say, then, that mainstream economics does not constitute
a single identi® able research program, and that we appear to have entered upon a
new period of pluralism in economics, structurally speaking perhaps not unlike
the past interwar pluralism. That mainstream economics has been thought a
single research program may be a consequence of the long shadow cast by neo-
classical economics. It may also re¯ ect the social organization of contemporary
economics. The term ``mainstream economics’ ’ is really more of a sociological
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term, and usually refers to the professional dominance of the ® eld in research and
employment by a relatively small set of academic institutions. From a history of
economics, as opposed to a history of economic thought perspective, mainstream
economics is a hierarchical set of institutions interwoven with historical social
structures, particularly those that arose in the United States in the last half cen-
tury. In the case of neoclassicism, many have argued that the theory’s individualist
focus ideologically facilitated a neo-liberal regime that helped justify the roles and
prerogatives of the State (particularly with respect to demand management and
military-corporate power), the relationship between labor and capital, and the
internationalization of trade and capital ¯ ows. Does mainstream economics have
a comparable function in contemporary society? Or let me ® rst ask, what ideo-
logical roles do mainstream economists play in contemporary society?
Drawing on the insights of the contributors to their 1998 History of Political
Economy volume, Mary Morgan and Malcolm Rutherford note a change not so
much in the methods as in the style of postwar economists which they character-
ize as a matter of their adopting a `` self-defensive technocratic approach’ ’
(Morgan and Rutherford 1998, p. 17). In their view, `` it was not so much what
the technical tools would do for you but rather that the language of mathematics
and statistics appeared to be more neutral and objective, and more diYcult for
the layperson and politician, leaving the economists less open to outside attacks
about matters of belief ’ ’ (Morgan and Rutherford 1998 p. 18, emphasis added).
Originally, this posture was a product of the cold war and the in¯ uence of the
many patrons of economics (Goodwin 1998). In time, however, inaccessibility to
outsiders became the hallmark of professionalism, objectivity was de® ned in
terms of technique, and the style of being an expert became a goal in itself.
Thus, as inaccessibility is a condition for expertise, mainstream economists
secured their own professional status at the expense of economics’ intelligibility
to non-economists. This suggests that mainstream economists gained a new
ideological role for themselves by sacri® cing mainstream economics’ having an
ideological function. Is this true? It would be consistent with mainstream
economics’ fragmentation into multiple, incommensurable approaches, since
mainstream economics not having a single, dominant interpretation of the
economic organization of society would also place a premium on the services of
experts.
There seem to me to be two diVerent ways of understanding the consequences
of this development for the ideological fortunes of mainstream economics. The
® rst, which may be naõ È ve, assumes that western society still invests considerable
signi® cance in the individual Ð politically, ethically, culturally, and sociallyÐ and
that mainstream economics’ failure to oVer a new theory of the individual, while
yet sponsoring the cult of the expert, has signi® cantly reduced its ideological
importance. Of course, contemporary social thinking about individuals is com-
plex, and the crude Lockean atomist view of the individual has no more
place in society today than it does in mainstream economics. But mainstream
economics has failed to follow up on this by contributing to changing thinking
about individuals. Thus, if questions regarding democracy, human rights, per-
sonal development, and individual achievement continue to direct our normative
thinking, and if these matters do need to be framed in terms of individuals, then
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from an ideological perspective mainstream economics may not be in very good
health at all.
The second way of seeing this development involves a darker vision. Suppose
that contemporary society has actually abandoned interest in the individual, and
the talk and writing we still hear and see about individuals is a vestigial, last
expression of our modernist illusions. In this case, mainstream economics might
not only not be unhealthy, but might even be a harbinger of an increasingly
impersonal future. Mirowski’s view of mainstream economics as the new cyborg
science ® ts this vision. Here the expert is a rather less heroic ® gure. Masters of
externally indecipherable techniques and methods, experts are but agents of their
tools, and their ideological role as expert individuals is as diminished as that of
the individual in mainstream economics. Mainstream economics, then, as no
more than a disparate collection of tools/experts, would lack a monolithic
ideological identity, yet it might exercise an undetected ideological presence,
behind the backs of individuals, as if by a new invisible hand.
I don’t know if either of these two visions is correct. Perhaps they are in
contest with one another, and the future depends upon how the contest plays
out. But then mainstream economics’ part in the drama seems settled, since
absent a new theory of the individual it weighs in on economics as a Newtonian
or cyborg science. What concerns me is whether there are resources elsewhere in
economics to contest for the individual in economics. In closing, then, let me
brie¯ y outline heterodox economic thinking about socially embedded individuals.
V. THE THEORY OF THE INDIVIDUAL IN HETERODOX
ECONOMICS
The idea that individuals are `` embedded and enmeshed in a variety of institu-
tions’ ’ is particularly due to Polanyi (Polanyi 1968, p. 217; also Polanyi 1944)
and more recently Granovetter (1985). Whereas de® ning individuals in terms of
their states of consciousness involves what can be termed an internalist de® nition
of the individual, understanding individuals as socially embedded de® nes them
in terms of their relations to one anotherÐ what can be termed an externalist
de® nition of the individual. It is true that heterodox economics is holist rather
than individualist in orientation, and holism understood to mean that the parts
of a social whole are conditioned by the whole does imply for some heterodox
economists that individuals are not independent agents in economic life. Hetero-
dox economists of this persuasion no more have a theory of the individual than
do mainstream economists. But most heterodox economists, I believe, hold a more
moderate form of holism that maintains that while social wholes, institutions, and
social structure in¯ uence individuals, individuals also in¯ uence social wholes,
institutions, and social structure (cf. e.g., Rutherford 1994; Hodgson 2000a,
2000b; Lawson 1997). The question they face is how to articulate these reciprocal
in¯ uences so as to go beyond the largely metaphorical meaning involved in
simply characterizing individuals as socially embedded (Oinas 1997).
The most promising strategy for doing this in my view involves explaining
individual behavior in social groups according to recent collective intentionality
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analysis (cf., e.g., Etzioni 1988; Gilbert 1989; Searle 1995; Tuomela 1995;
Anderson 2001). Collective intentionality analysis is based on the assumption
that people express we-intentions and use ® rst person plural we-language as
commonly as they express I-intentions and use ® rst person singular I-language.
We-intentions and we-language concern what individuals believe to be the
intentions of groups of which they are members. But this analysis is individualistic
in the sense that individuals alone form intentions, not groups, though indi-
viduals’ we-intentions concern matters they ascribe to groups. What, then,
explains individuals’ social embeddedness is the way in which individuals respond
to others when they form we-intentions. Just as the use of all language constrains
individuals to observe accepted usages, so the use of we-language is socially
constrained as well. We-language, however, is even more severely constrained
than most ordinary speech since it directly implicates others who fall under the
we-statements individuals express. Consequently, individuals behave indepen-
dently in expressing we-intentions, but their social embeddedness is manifest in
the in¯ uence that others exert regarding accepted uses of we-language. This
makes the in¯ uence of social wholes on individuals important. At the same time,
individuals in¯ uence social wholes in their capacity to shift and change estab-
lished uses of we-language.
Collective intentionality analysis has been used to explain individuals ’ attention
to rules and norms, and can underlie explanations of institutions and social
values (cf. Tuomela 1995). I cannot go into more detail about this here. My
purpose is only to sketch an alternative framework that might address some of
the diYculties involved in talking about individuals in our highly structured
contemporary society. Those diYculties, I believe, stem from the fact that
individual life in contemporary society is enmeshed in a countless cross-cutting
group relationships. Understanding the individual from an atomist perspective
in this light seems a hopeless endeavor, because that framework explains the
individual apart from the social relationships that so much de® ne individual life.
Thus, if individual life is now more social, a theory of the individual that re¯ ects
this must be externalist rather than internalist. Individuals as socially embedded,
theorized in a collective intentionality manner, oVers elements of such an
account.
So my view of the contest of visions above is that the future turns in part on
whether a viable, post-Lockean defense of the individual is yet to come from
economics. A more enlightened, if not Enlightenment, view of the individual
seems to me necessary if social policy in¯ uenced by economics is to defend
democracy, human rights, personal development, and individual achievement.
Defense of this normative horizon does not seem forthcoming from a mainstream
economics born of neoclassicism’s failed modernist theory of the individual. But
such a defense may be available in heterodox economics’ alternative tradition of
thinking about individuals as socially embedded.
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